




















Despite voluminous literature on the link between CEO duality（i.e., Chief Executive Officer, the CEO,
also serves as Chairman of the board）and corporate performance, there is scant research on the link between
CEO­Chairman family relationship and firm performance, whereby CEO and Chairman of the board are same
person or individually different persons but come from the same family. We fill this gap by hand­collecting
necessary data from the annual reports of non­financial firms listed in Dhaka Stock Exchange（DSE）, Bangla­
desh covering the period 2010­2014 employing multivariate regression analysis（OLS and two­way clustered
standard error）. We find that CEO­Chairman family connection has a significant negative influence on firm
performance, as measured by return on assets（ROA）and no significant impact on firm performance when
measured by Tobin’s Q. This relationship holds even after controlling board ownership and institutional owner­
ship. This finding is consistent with the prediction of agency theory, which suggests that the CEO­Chairman
family relationship could make the CEO more powerful and render the board ineffective in monitoring manag­
ers leading to unbridled managerial opportunism and deteriorating firm performance. The study has clear impli­
cations for governance, regulation, and legislation for emerging economies where family dominance in the
board is seen to be a critical feature of corporate firms.
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